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Abstract
We develop a new method of quantifying the impact of policy announcements on
investment rates that makes use of stock market data. By estimating the effect of U.S.-
China tariff announcements on aggregate returns and the differential returns of firms
exposed to China, we identify their effect on treated and untreated firms. We show
theoretically and empirically that estimates of policy-induced stock-market declines
imply lower returns to capital, which lowers investment rates. We estimate that the
tariff actions through 2018 and 2019 will lower the investment growth rate of listed
U.S. companies by 1.9 percentage points by the end of 2020.
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1 Introduction
What was the impact of the U.S.-China trade war on aggregate investment? A major chal-
lenge in addressing this question is that standard methodologies such as differences-in-
differences regressions can only identify the differential effect of a policy announcement
on the treated firms relative to the untreated. We overcome this limitation by develop-
ing a new methodology that enables us to estimate (rather than calibrate) the effect of an
event on treated and untreated firms. Our contribution is to show that by using a variant
of a stock-market event study, one can identify the impact of a policy announcement on
aggregate stock market returns and the impact on the returns of firms that are differen-
tially exposed to the announcement. We use these two estimates to exactly decompose an
event’s impact into two components: the “common effect” (how an event affected returns
by changing factors or variables that matter for firms in general) and the “differential ef-
fect” (the additional effect on treated firms). We show theoretically and empirically that
estimates of policy-induced stock-market declines cause lower returns to capital and re-
duce aggregate investment rates.
We apply this methodology to the data using U.S.-China trade war announcements in
2018 and 2019. As has often been noted, U.S.-China trade-war announcements have been
associated with large stock-price declines. In our baseline specification, we find that U.S.
and Chinese tariff announcements lowered U.S. aggregate equity prices in our sample of
approximately 3,000 firms in the COMPUSTAT database by 6.0 percentage points. Given
that our sample of firms had a market capitalization of $28 trillion, the aggregate lost firm
value equals $1.7 trillion. We also show that while the trade war depressed equity values
by lowering the returns of firms exposed to China, it had even larger negative effects by
lowering the returns of firms more broadly. Of the 6.0 percent drop in equity prices, 3.4
percentage points can be attributed to the common effects and 2.6 percentage points can
be attributed to the differentially poor performance of firms importing from, exporting
to, or selling in China.
Our new methodology draws on the natural relationship between stock prices and
market-to-book (MTB) values to estimate the aggregate investment effect. In the q theory
of investment, which forms the basis of our link between firm values and investment, a
firm’s MTB value equals its expected return on capital. Thus, the lower stock prices aris-
ing from the U.S.-China trade war should reflect lower returns to capital (as measured
by MTB values), which lowers the incentive to invest. We estimate that U.S.-China tar-
iff announcements lowered the 4-quarter growth rates of listed firms by 0.3 percentage
points in the fourth quarter of 2019 and will lower it by another 1.6 percentage points in
the fourth quarter of 2020, resulting in a total decline of 1.9 percent.
Our decomposition builds on the work of Gabaix and Koijen (2019) and the factor-
model approach of Bai and Ng (2002). These models posit that one can decompose firms’
stock returns into movements related to a set of “common” factors that matter in general
and an idiosyncratic firm-specific time-varying residual. Thus, any determinant of re-
turns that matters in a non-trivial fraction of observations—e.g., shifts in macro variables
like changes in expected growth rates—should be captured by one or more common fac-
tors, with the total number of estimated factors determined by some selection criterion.
Importantly, these common factors can have heterogeneous effects on firms (captured by
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the factor loadings), so not all firms necessarily respond the same way to a change in
expected economic conditions. Thus, a factor model should capture the impact of any
model in which some set of variables systematically moves stock returns throughout the
sample.
We show that any event study can be nested inside a factor model. An event study ex-
amines factors or variables that are not common—they do not matter in general, but they
do matter in a short time period called an event window. In other words, a stock-market
event study is an analysis of the residual of a factor model. Indeed, the differences-in-
differences approach can be thought of as a means of using additional identifying as-
sumptions in order to estimate the effects of a set of non-common factors. For example,
the assumption that we know when the event-specific factor is relevant and when it is
not, is tantamount to assuming that we do not need to estimate its value—we assume it
can be proxied by an event indicator variable that equals one during the event window
and zero otherwise. Similarly, the assumption that the impact of the event-specific factor
can be captured by a constant times an observable treatment variable is isomorphic to
assuming that the factor loadings cannot vary arbitrarily by firm but also must be pro-
portional to the treatment variable. These assumptions dramatically reduce the number
of parameters to be estimated but do not alter the fact that an event study can be written
as a factor model in which a time-varying factor (the event indicator) has different effects
on firms during an event window.
Since an event study can be nested into a factor model and factor models can be used
to exactly decompose a dataset, we can decompose stock returns in an event window
into the component explainable by the common effect, differential effect, and an idiosyn-
cratic term. Importantly, we define the common effect to be the implied movement in
equities due to the factor model plus a day fixed effect from the event study. This pro-
cedure enables us to allow for the possibility that in an event window, past relationships
between returns and factors might break down, and an event-specific factor might move
the returns of all firms for some other reason.
Our choice of which treatment variables to include in our event study is conventional.
We follow Huang et al. (2019) in our selection of the observable exposure (or treatment)
variables that matter when doing a stock-market event study of the U.S.-China trade war:
whether the firm exports to or imports from China as well as the fraction of its revenues
that it obtains from the Chinese market. This sales channel also turns out to be an im-
portant reason why the trade war hurt U.S. firms, perhaps reflecting the fact that U.S.
tariffs not only likely provoked Chinese tariff and non-tariff retaliation, but also hurt U.S.
multinationals by slowing their sales growth in China.1
One notable difference with other stock-market event studies that have focused on the
trade war is that we use a systematic method to identify key trade war events to avoid
potential biases arising from choosing events on an ad hoc basis. We argue that days
1While the U.S. only exported $130 billion to China in 2017, sales by U.S. multinationals amounted to
$376 billion. Indeed, although the large bilateral deficit in 2017 was driven by the fact U.S. exports to China
were only a quarter as large as Chinese exports to the U.S, total sales (exports plus multinational sales) by
U.S. firms in China were only 11 percent lower than total sales by Chinese firms in the U.S. market. Sales
in China by U.S. firms were $505 billion and sales in the U.S. by Chinese firms were $570 billion. Source:
Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Census.
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in which significant information about the trade war was released are likely to be days
in which there are likely to be peaks in the number of Google searches for the phrase
“trade war.” We use this method to identify eleven events between January 1, 2018 and
December 31, 2019, which based on a reading of the newspapers on these days, can be
further broken down into three subsets: four U.S. tariff announcements, three Chinese
tariff announcements, and four other trade-war announcements. This last category con-
tains announcements—e.g., tariff retaliation announcements by Mexico and the European
Union—that are not directly related to bilateral U.S.-China tariffs. Having this last cate-
gory of “other events” enables us to conduct a placebo test of whether firms exposed
to China suffered negative returns when other countries retaliated against the U.S. or
whether there was something specific about U.S. and Chinese tariff announcements that
negatively affected these firms. Consistent with our identifying assumption, other trade-
war announcements have no differential effect on firms exposed to China, but do have
large, negative common effect that lowers returns for firms regardless of their China ex-
posure.
We examine the impact of these trade war announcements using event windows ex-
tending from one to thirty trading days after the announcements. Cumulating the gains
and losses across all seven U.S.-China tariff events, we find that U.S. equity prices fell 9.7
percent using a conventional 3-day event windows (the trading day before, the trading
day of, and the trading day after an announcement). Stock prices partially rebounded,
however, recovering close to half of their lost value—down only 4.3 percent—when we
use 7-day windows starting the day before each event and extending five days afterwards.
These results are consistent with models of stock-market overshooting in response to sur-
prising news (e.g., De Bondt and Thaler (1985)). Our estimates of the total impact of the
general and differential effects of tariff announcements on equity prices are fairly stable
for a variety of window lengths: ranging from -6.0 percent in our benchmark specifica-
tion based on a 7-day window to -8.3 percent when we use 3-day windows. Similarly, our
estimate of the differential effect of the trade war on stock prices also does not vary much
as we change the window length.
Interestingly, we estimate that most of the reduction in U.S. market value arose from
U.S. tariff announcements; Chinese retaliation announcements mostly had small effects
on U.S. stock prices. There are a number of plausible explanations for this result. First,
markets may have viewed the surprising piece of information associated with the trade
war was the U.S. decision to apply tariffs. Second, the value of U.S. exports to China was
much lower than the value of Chinese exports to the U.S, so China’s ability to retaliate
was more limited. Third, Chinese retaliation may have been priced into the reactions to
U.S. tariff announcements.
The last part of the paper embeds our estimates of the policy-induced reductions in
firm market value into a model of investment. We show that reductions in share prices
due to trade war announcements significantly lower firm-level investment rates four
quarters later. Most of the 2019 effect is driven by the impact of tariffs on U.S. firms
doing business with China, but the 2020 effects are driven more by the fact that tariff an-
nouncements drove down returns of firms regardless of their exposure to China, and this
information lowered investment incentives. Since the baseline specifications employ con-
servative estimates of the impacts of the tariffs, alternative specifications tend to produce
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more negative effects on investment.
Our paper builds on a number of literatures. A large literature has developed that
aims to measure the costs of protection using models in which adjustment is costless. For
example, Amiti et al. (2019) and Fajgelbaum et al. (2019) estimate the costs of the trade
war in conventional trade models. Caliendo and Parro (2015) estimate the gains from the
North American Free Trade Agreement, and Ossa (2014) estimates the costs of a hypo-
thetical trade war. Similarly, Baldwin and Forslid (1999) and Baldwin and Forslid (2000)
develop a q-theory model of trade with costless adjustment, so firms can instantly adjust
their capital stocks in response to any policy-induced change in prices. Our work differs
in that we assume that there may be adjustment costs associated with a firm increasing
or decreasing its capital stock, estimate these costs, and show that these matter for invest-
ment as is standard in the finance literature.
Our paper is also related to papers that use stock market event studies to evaluate
the impact of trade on firms in a specific factors setting in which adjustment costs are
infinitely high (c.f., Grossman and Levinsohn (1989), Fisman et al. (2014), Egger and Zhu
(2019), Huang et al. (2019), Bianconi et al. (2019), and Greenland et al. (2019)). These
models share the feature that trade-induced price changes affect firm value. We build on
this insights by showing how one can nest an event-study setup into a factor model to not
only identify a trade shock’s differential effect on exposed firms, but also the aggregate
effect. Moreover, rather than assuming that adjustment costs are infinite, we show how
we can use these estimates to identify the key adjustment-cost parameter and then embed
the estimates into a structural investment equation to estimate the impact of the shocks.
We are also related to studies of trade policy uncertainty. Important papers in this lit-
erature include Caldara et al. (2019), Handley and Limão (2015, 2017), Pierce and Schott
(2016), Feng et al. (2017), Crowley et al. (2018), Crowley et al. (2019), and Steinberg (2019).
We differ from all of these papers in that we decompose stock market returns in re-
sponse to trade announcements to identify the differential and general impacts of tariff
announcements (as opposed to trade-policy uncertainty) on firms and embed these esti-
mates in a q-theory of investment with costly adjustment.
We are also related to a number of important papers in macro (c.f., Nakamura and
Steinsson (2018) and Wolf (2019) that have used high frequency data and model-imposed
restrictions to identify general equilibrium effects. Although our paper looks at a very
different set of policies and mechanisms, we are similar in that we seek to identify com-
mon effects by using high-frequency data and explore the links between differences-in-
differences estimators and aggregate effects.
Finally, our paper also builds off of the large finance literature that has developed re-
garding the estimation of q-theory models of investment. In particular, we use Hayashi
(1982)’s insight about conditions when marginal and average q are the same, and employ
the approach of Frank and Shen (2016) to construct our measure of MTB values. We also
make use of results derived in Abel and Panageas (2020) to understand potential measure-
ment error biases in investment regressions as well as work by Peters and Taylor (2017),
Erickson and Whited (2012), and Erickson et al. (2014) that have developed sophisticated
econometric techniques to estimate adjustment costs.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the theory. We show how
to map an event study into a factor model in Section 2.1 and present the decomposition
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of stock-market returns into the common effect and and the differential effect in Section
2.2. Section 2.3 shows how these estimates can be embedded in the q-theory model of
investment. Section 3 discusses the data we use. Section 4 presents the results, and we
conclude in Section 5.
2 Theory
Our theory will proceed in two steps. In sections 2.1 and 2.2, we show how one can use
stock market data to exactly decompose aggregate returns into those caused by common
and differential effects. In Section 2.3, we modify the standard q theory of investment so
that we can write it in a form suitable for understanding how trade shocks affect invest-
ment in a model where capital adjustment is costly. We use the decomposition obtained
in Section 2.2 to construct an instrumental variable that enables us to estimate the impact
of trade shocks on investment and then use these estimates to predict the impact of the
tariff announcements on investment.
2.1 Event Studies and Stock Market Returns
We define rft as the percentage change in the firm’s share price on day t We ignore all
days in which markets are closed from the sample, so that day t+1 is the trading day after
day t. We assume that the percentage change in a firm’s share price can be written as a
function of K ≥ 1 unspecified common factors (δkt) and the idiosyncratic or abnormal
return (ft):
rft = αf +
K∑
k=1
βkfδkt + ft, (1)
where αf is the underlying rate of return for the firm, and βkf is the loading on the factor k.
An important feature of factor models is that the factors (δkt) do not have a firm subscript,
so these factors capture the impact of common (i.e., not firm-specific) information released
on day t. Thus, while a factor (δkt) may affect firms differently (if βkf 6= βkf ′ for some
f and f ′), it may nonetheless be common in the sense that it matters in general.2 All
firm-specific information is therefore embodied in the error term, ft.
This approach nests a number of popular ways of describing stock markets. For ex-
ample, the CAPM is a special case in which the econometrician makes a number of iden-
tifying assumptions: K = 2, δ1t equals the risk-free rate, and δ2t equals a stock-market
index (e.g., the S&P 500). Similarly, the Fama-French factor models can also be thought of
as special cases in which additional factors are assumed to be equal to certain variables
(e.g., the differential returns of small firms relative to large firms). We will work with
this more general setup to avoid making the results dependent on a particular model of
2Following Bai and Ng (2002) and the factor model literature, a necessary condition for a factor to be









> 0. This condition will be violated for any factor that is only
non-zero for a finite number of days (e.g., only during an event window), since the limit will be zero. Bai
and Ng (2002) also formalize a second condition on the factor loadings (βkf ) that ensures that the factors
contribute to a non-trivial share of the variance. When we say a factor is “common” or matters “in general,”
we assume that it satisfies these two conditions.
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asset pricing. The decision about which factors are relevant can be determined by esti-
mating equation (1) over some horizon and choosing a set of relevant factors (variables)
that satisfy some selection criterion.
An event study can be thought of as a situation in which the econometrician has some
extra information about some factor or variable that is not relevant in general (as defined
in footnote 2), but does matter during some finite “event window”. Thus, if we were to
include it in equation (1), the extra factor would not satisfy the selection criterion, but we
still might have prior information that the factor indeed matters on certain days. In our
study, we consider events that involve U.S. or Chinese tariff events. We define the set of
U.S. events as ΩU , the set of Chinese events as ΩC and the set of U.S. and Chinese events
as ΩUC = ΩU ⋃ΩC . We assume that information about this event may start affecting
returns up to one day before event j and up to w days after the event. In this case, our
event window can be defined as t ∈ [j − 1, j + w], where w + 2 is the length of the event
window. We define Dwjt to be an indicator variable that is one if day t falls within the
event window for event j and zero otherwise. During the event window, we assume that
there is a set of treatment variables Zif (i ∈ {1, ..., N}) that identify whether a firm is an
importer from China, an exporter to China, or the share of its revenues that accrues from
China. We can rewrite the error term in equation (1) as







jt + νft ∀j, t s.t.
∑
j∈ΩUC
Dwjt > 0, (2)
where θt is a parameter that captures how events on day t moved the market differently
from how the factor model would have predicted; γij is a parameter that indicates how
much treatment variable Zif affected the abnormal return of firm f during event j; and
νft is an i.i.d. error that is distributed N(0, σ). An interesting feature of the structure
of a standard event study (equation (2)) is that it is isomorphic with that of the factor
model given in equation (1) with some additional identifying restrictions. For example,
the first factor is θt and we assume its factor loading is one. Similarly, we assume we know
that the value of the next N factors equal the indicator variables Dwjt and that their factor
loadings are constrained to be proportional to the treatment variables (i.e.,
∑N
i=1 γijZif ).
Nevertheless, the structure is the same.
In order to estimate all the event-study parameters, we use the standard two-step
procedure—we estimate the factor model in equation (1), and then we use the estimated
abnormal returns (ˆft) as the dependent variable when estimating (2). An important fea-
ture of our approach is that we do not pool across events. Thus, if event j contains impor-
tant information about stock returns and event j′ does not, we will have E (γˆij) 6= 0 and
E (γˆij′) = 0. As we will see below, this feature of the estimation procedure will ensure that
our decomposition and investment results are not biased even if we mistakenly include
events that do not matter for our event study.
2.2 Decomposing Returns
Our next task is to understand how an event affects firms irrespective of their relative
exposure to China. After estimating equations (1) and (2), we can decompose the firm’s
rate of return on any day within an event window as
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rCft captures how information released on day t within an event window affects the return
of a firm through two channels: the amount that the factor model would have predicted
(
∑K
k=1 βˆkf δˆkt) based on movements of common factors, and the average deviation from
this amount (θˆt). This last term captures the impact of any factor that is not common
in equation 1 but is relevant during the event window affecting all firms. Implicitly,
we are assuming that within the event window, movements in the common factors are
determined by the event. The variable rDft captures the differential impact of treatment
during the event window. Finally, we assume that outside of the event window returns
(rft) are determined by the factor model given in equation (1) instead of (3), so we set
rCft = rDft = νˆft = 0 outside of the event window
We can obtain intuition for how this decomposition works by considering a few ex-
amples. If policy uncertainty rose on an announcement date t, and the role of policy
uncertainty is captured by some factor (δkt), then βˆkf δˆkt would capture how much this
rise in policy uncertainty should affect firm f ’s return. On the other hand, if policy un-
certainty is not a variable that matters much outside the event window (so no factor in
the factor model captures its role) but then starts to matter in the event window, θˆt would
be our estimate of how this event-specific factor moves returns in general. Finally, if pol-
icy uncertainty does not matter outside the event window and only affects firms that are
directly exposed to China in some way, it will be captured by rDft. Obviously, these are
stark examples, and in practice one should expect all three channels to capture some of
the variation. However, to the extent that a firm’s stock movement can be explained by
some general relationship (
∑K
k=1 βˆkf δˆkt) or some event-specific factor that moved all firm
returns (θˆt), it will be captured by rCft. On the other hand, differences from this prediction
that are correlated with some treatment variable (Zif ) during the event window will be
captured by rDft.
We now use equations (3) and (4) to decompose aggregate market returns. The market
return on a day (Rt) is the market-capitalization weighted average of the return of each
individual stock, i.e., Rt ≡ ∑f Sf,t−1rft, where Sf,t−1 is the share of total market capital-
ization in period t−1 accounted for by firm f , and so∑f Sf,t−1 = 1. Substituting equation






















where Rαt is the typical daily return of the market in the absence of any new informa-
tion; RCt captures market movements due to factors that matter in general or moved all
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returns in general; RDt captures how the differential returns of firms exposed to China
moved aggregate returns on day t; and RIt is the idiosyncratic component of stock market





. If we want to see how an event j affected market abnormal returns over





Rj+` and RXj (w) ≡
w∑
`=−1
RXj+` for X ∈ {α,C,D, I} . (6)
In this decomposition Rαj (w) captures the the stock-market movement that we should
have expected during the event window due to the underlying upward drift in stocks;
RCj (w) is the impact of the common effect on aggregate stock-market returns; RDj (w) cap-
tures how the differential returns of treated firms affected aggregate stock-price move-
ments; and RIj (w) is a residual that captures the impact of idiosyncratic firm-specific ab-
normal returns that cannot be explained by any common factors or treatment variable
during the event. As we show in the appendix, this decomposition can also be amended
for cases in which we want to compute the impacts of different classes of events (e.g., U.S.
and Chinese tariff announcements).
2.3 A q-Theory of Investment
As we show in the online appendix, the q theory of investment can be used to derive
the following equation linking a firm’s investment level in quarter s (Ifs) relative to its
initial capital stock (Kfs) to a firm-specific depreciation rate (ρf ), the cost of investment
goods (ps), the shadow value of return to capital (qfs), and a parameter that governs the
magnitude of capital adjustment costs (ψ):
Ifs
Kfs





If ψ = 0, we are in a frictionless world in which capital stocks adjust instantly to the
optimal level, so the shadow value of capital equals the cost of investment of goods (i.e.,
qfs = ps). In contrast, if ψ is infinite, firms are unable to adjust their capital stocks (as
in the specific-factors model), and movements in the returns to capital will not affect
investment. In general, we expect that 0 < ψ <∞. Thus, as long as we are not in a world
of zero or infinite adjustment costs, a reduction in the shadow value of capital (qfs) will
also reduce the optimal investment rate.
We next make use of the Hayashi (1982) result that if the capital adjustment cost is
homogeneous of degree one in investment and capital3 and production is constant returns
to scale, we can write Vfs/Kfs = qfs + ψχfs, where Vfs/Kfs is the market-to-book (MTB)









3This condition is satisfied in our derivation of equation (7) in the online appendix.
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It is straightforward to think about how an announcement will affect investment in










where the third term on the right hand side tells us how much an event affects the firm’s
investment growth rate, through its effect on MTB. Second, we assume the impact of an
event on MTB value is proportional to its impact on share prices. It will prove useful to
measure these impacts by converting the key stock market variables in equation (3) from













where F (s) is the first day in quarter s and L (s) is the last day. We can write the move-




= λC r¯Cfs + λDr¯Dfs + λν ν¯fs + λr
(
r¯fs − r¯Cfs − r¯Dfs − ν¯fs
)
, (11)
where λC , and λD are parameters that capture how share price movements due to the
common and differential effects moved MTB values during the event window; λν informs
us about how idiosyncratic share-price movements map into changes in MTB values; and
the λr terms tell us how share price movements affect MTB values outside of the event
window.4
If all of these λ’s were equal, then simply knowing the magnitude of a share-price
movement would be a sufficient statistic for how much a policy induced movement in
share prices affects MTB values. However, they need not be equal. For example, a move-
ment in share prices due to an idiosyncratic piece of information about a firm is likely
to only move a firm’s market value because the firm’s share price changed. However,
a movement in share prices due the common effect (r¯Cfs) might not only affect the MTB
value of a firm because its share price changed, but also because it caused changes in the
values of other assets owned by the firm.









Summing this expression across all firms and dividing both sides by aggregate invest-
ment (Is) gives an expression for how the event affected aggregate investment through
each of these channels:









are only non-zero during an event window. Since αf ≈ 0 and there is very little variation in the number of







avoid notational clutter. In practice, our estimates are only trivially affected by the inclusion of this term.




















In order to implement this equation, we need to obtain estimates for ψ−1, λC , and λD.
We will explore a number of ways of estimating the impact of MTB value on investment
(ψ−1). The simplest is OLS estimation of equation (8). In order to take equation (8) to the
data, we need to be precise about when a period begins and ends. Usually, this equation is
estimated with annual data, so the relevant MTB value (Vfs/Kfs) one year earlier is used
to explain the investment that occurs in the following year. In order to be consistent with
this work, we need to lag the MTB values by four quarters, so that our estimates reflect
how MTB values four quarters ago affect current investment.5 We therefore rewrite our
empirical implementation of equation (8) as
Ifs
Kf,s−4





A large literature has developed in finance that concerns possible biases in estimates
of ψ−1 that might arise from the estimation of equation (14). Abel and Panageas (2020)
show that in the presence of financial constraints, estimates of ψ−1 will be biased upwards
due to non-classical measurement error, but they will be biased downwards if one also
includes a cash-flow control variable in the regression. Thus, the true value is partially
identified and should lie between these bounds. We will make use of this result and
consider the sensitivity of our results to the presence of non-classical measurement error.






6= 0 due to classical measurement error or
for some other reason. In order to deal with this potential problem, we need an instru-
ment that is correlated with MTB values but not correlated with measurement error or
shifts in tax treatment of past investments. One plausible instrument set comprises the
various components of abnormal returns due to exposure to China. However, since ab-
normal returns are expressed in percent changes, the impact of protection on firm stock
prices is more likely to explain changes in MTB values than levels, so in order to use this














where ∆4 is a 4-quarter difference operator, and ∆4 ps
ψ
is a term that we can estimate by




X¯f` for X ∈
{
r, rC , rD, ν
}
(16)





, and the fact that we have
more than one instrument for this variable lets us use overidentification tests to verify
their validity.
5This also helps avoid issues with seasonality.
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We construct an instrument that is correlated with movements in MTB values between
eight and four quarters before period s by leveraging our estimates of how protection and






under the assumption that policy announcements that affect share prices
affect MTB values but do not have an independent effect on investment. Similarly, id-
iosyncratic variation in firm prices is also a potentially valid instrument. Because we
have several instruments for a change in MTB value, we can run an over-identification
test to check the plausibility of these assumptions. A second advantage of this approach
is that we can use the first-stage equation to obtain an estimate for how the various com-
ponents of stock price movements affect MTB values (i.e., λC , λD, λν , λr). We take a






= ηf + ηt + λC r˜Cfs + λDr˜Dfs + λν ν˜fs + λrr˙fs + ζfs, (17)
where r˙fs ≡ r˜fs − r˜Cfs − r˜Dfs − ν˜fs; ηf and ηt are firm and time fixed effects that capture
different intercepts for each term and any time varying component of higher order terms;
and ζfs is an error term that captures the impact of higher order terms. Finally, we can


















This will provide us with an estimate of the aggregate effects of the US-China trade war
announcements on U.S. aggregate investment.
3 Data
Our analysis requires data on stock returns, balance sheet items, exposure to China, and
event dates. Our stock return data are from the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) provided by Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS), for every trading day
in 2016-2019. The balance sheet data (e.g., investment, cash flows, MTB, etc.), covering
the same period but at the quarterly frequency, are from the CRSP/Compustat Merged
(CCM) data also provided by WRDS. When we merge the Compustat data with the CRSP
data for a balanced panel of firms that report stock returns on every day, we obtain a
sample of 2,864 firms that cover all sectors. We use the same procedure as in Frank and
Shen (2016) to construct our measures of the variables we use in the investment regres-
sions. The 2,864 listed firms that we use in our sample have investment rates that are
highly correlated with investment rates in national accounts. The correlation between
the growth rate of aggregate tangible fixed capital formation in Compustat data and the
growth rate of fixed capital in national accounts data is 0.92.6 Thus investment patterns in
our sample track national ones well. We report sample statistics and a mapping between
Compustat variable codes and our variables in the appendix.
6National accounts data is from FRED is Real Gross Private Domestic Investment: Fixed Investment:
Nonresidential: Equipment, Percent Change from Quarter One Year Ago, Quarterly, Not Seasonally Ad-
justed.
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We consider three ways in which firms are exposed to China: importing, exporting,
and foreign sales (either through exporting or subsidiaries). It is important to capture
indirect imports that are ultimately purchased by U.S. firms because many firms do not
import directly from China but instead obtain Chinese inputs through their subsidiaries
or the U.S. subsidiaries of foreign firms. For example, Apple Computer’s exposure to
China can arise through direct imports, imports obtained by its subsidiary (Beats Elec-
tronics), or from the purchase of iPhone’s from the U.S. subsidiary of Foxconn. In order
to identify the supply chains, we merge the Compustat data with S&P Capital IQ data us-
ing DUNS numbers to create the network of firm suppliers that potentially import from
China. We define “China Revenue Share” to be the share of a firm’s revenues in 2018
(either obtained through sales of subsidiaries or exports) that arise from sales in China as
reported in FactSet. Finally, we also used data on firm employment from FactSet.
We also merge the firm names from Compustat, S&P Capital IQ, and FactSet with
Datamyne data to identify which firms are trading with China directly or indirectly
through their network or suppliers. The Datamyne data has a number of limitations.
First, it only covers seaborne trade. Fortunately, U.S. Census data reveals that in 2017, 62
percent of all imports from China and 58 percent of exports to China are conducted by
sea, so we capture over half of the value of U.S. China trade. A second problem is that
while some of the Datamyne data is at the Harmonized System (HS) 6-digit level, much
of it is at the HS2-digit level. Since U.S. tariffs are set at the Harmonized Tariff System
8-digit level, it is not possible to know what share of a firm’s trade was affected by tariffs.
We therefore opt to use a binary exposure measure. Our “China Import” dummy is one if
the firm or its supply network imported from China in 2017 and zero otherwise. We also
construct a “China Export” dummy analogously for exports.
Table 1: China Trade Exposure of Listed U.S. Firms
Mean
Firm Imports from China 0.07
Firm or Subsidiary Imports from China 0.23
Firm, Subsidiary, or Supplier Imports from China 0.27
Firm Exports to China 0.01
Firm or Subsidiary Exports to China 0.04
Firm Exposed to China 0.46
Number of Firms: 2,864
Note: This table reports the means of indicator variables that are one if a firm satisfies the listed criterion.
These data show that the supply chain information is critical in understanding firms’
exposure to international trade. From Table 1, we see that only about 7 percent of the
firms in our sample import directly from China, and only 1 percent export directly to
China. However, if we take into account subsidiaries, these numbers rise to 23 and 4
percent, respectively. When we add in imports by all firms in the supply chain, we see
that 27 percent of all listed firms in the U.S. import directly or indirectly from China.
While only 4 percent of all firms export to China, the average firm in our sample obtained
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2.3 percent of its revenue from China. In the last row of the table, we construct a variable,
“Firm Exposed to China” if any firm in the firm’s network exported to or imported from
China or if the firm had positive revenues from China. We see that 46 percent of all firms
were exposed to China through one of these channels. Consistent with prior work, we
find that all of our China exposure measures are positively correlated (ρImp,Exp = 0.26,
ρImp,Rev = 0.24, and ρExp,Rev = 0.08), which suggests that firms that are affected by U.S.
tariffs are also likely to be firms that are more exposed to Chinese retaliation on exports
to or sales in China.
There were a large number of trade war announcements that occurred during the
course of the first two years of the U.S.-China trade war, so the choice of which announce-
ments are significant is not obvious ex ante. For example, Huang et al., 2019 focus much
of their event study analysis on one important event: the March 22, 2018 announcement
that the U.S. was proposing tariffs an a large fraction of Chinese imports, although they
consider a few other dates as well.7 By contrast, Egger and Zhu (2019) use twelve U.S.
events based on their assessment of the importance of the information on those days and
excluding announcements that did not specifically target China. In order to prevent the
possibility that we inadvertently pick dates that match stock movements consistent with
our priors, we use a systematic method of identifying the key event dates in the trade
war. We select our event dates based on Google Trends data. Google Trends provides
daily searching frequency on a term for periods of up to six months, and the reported
value is normalized based on all searches that occurred in the period.8 In particular, we
argue that when real information about the trade war enters the market, it is likely to
prompt people to search for the term “trade war.” Figure 1 presents the results from this
exercise. Google does not release the actual number of searches, so we do not know how
many searches a value of 100 implies, but we do know that it is twice as many searches as
a value of 50. A second feature of this graph is that it makes clear that after searches spike,
it often takes a few days for the rate of searching to fall back to its prior level. Based on
this, we define the start date of an event as the day on which the value of Google Trends
for “trade war” exceeds 40, and we do not allow a second event to begin until five calen-
dar days have passed after the first event.
Our method identifies 11 candidate events, which turn out to be easily classifiable into
three categories: U.S. tariff events, Chinese retaliation events, and other trade war related
events that do not involve U.S. or Chinese tariffs. Our first event is the March 1, 2018
announcement of steel and aluminum tariffs (which also targeted China). We classify
this event along with the March 22, 2018 event, the September 17, 2018 announcement of
tariffs on $200 billion of Chinese imports, and the May 10, 2019 announcement of the in-
crease in tariffs of those imports from 10 to 25 percent as “U.S. tariff” events. Our “China
7They also consider the April 3, 2018 list of targeted Chinese products, the conclusion of U.S.-China
trade talks on January 9, 2019, and the May 5, 2019 tweeted threat of an increase in U.S. tariffs as other
events.
8To splice together Google Trends series in different periods, we made five downloads for 2018-2019:
each download is a series for up to six months and an overlapping month with its previous period. We
start with values for the first six-month period (2018/01-06), regress the second period on it, and use the
predicted values for the second period. Then we regress the third period on the predicted values of the
second period, and repeat this process until all series are spliced together.
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Note: The figure reports the frequency of google searches for the phrase “trade war.” “Steel 3/1” is the March 1, 2018 announcement of
steel and aluminum tariffs (which also affected Chinese imports); “US-China1 3/22” is the March 22, 2018 announcement that the U.S.
was proposing tariffs on a large fraction of Chinese imports; “China-R1 4/2” is the April 2, 2018 announcement of Chinese retaliation
on 128 categories of U.S. exports; “China-R2 6/15” is the announcement that China was going to retaliate against $50 billion of U.S.
exports; “MX-R 7/5” is the July 5, 2018 Mexican announcement that they were going to retaliate in response to the steel and aluminum
tariffs; “EU-R 7/25” is the July 25, 2018 announcement that the European Union was preparing retaliatory tariffs on $20 billion of U.S.
exports; “US-China2 9/17” is the September 17, 2018 announcement of tariffs on $200 billion of Chinese imports; “US-China3 5/10”
is the May 10, 2019 announcement of the increase in tariffs of those imports from 10 to 25 percent; “Farm Sub 5/23” is the May 23,
2019 announcement of $16 billion of farm subsidies to help farmers affected by the trade war; “Devaluation 8/5” is the August 5, 2019
announcement that the People’s Bank of China was devaluing the yuan; and “China-R3 8/23” is the August 23, 2019 announcement
that China was going to raise tariffs on U.S. soybean and auto exports.
Retaliation” events consist of the April 2, 2018 announcement of Chinese retaliation on
128 categories of U.S. exports, the June 15, 2018 announcement that China was going to
retaliate against $50 billion of U.S. exports, and the August 23, 2019 announcement that
China was going to raise tariffs on U.S. soybean and auto exports. Finally, we identify
four “other” events that correspond to trade war related actions not involving the U.S.
and China: the July 5, 2018 Mexican announcement that they were going to retaliate in
response to the steel and aluminum tariffs, the July 25, 2018 announcement that the Eu-
ropean Union was preparing retaliatory tariffs on $20 billion of U.S. exports, the May 23,
2019 announcement of $16 billion of farm subsidies to help farmers affected by the trade
war, and the August 5, 2019 announcement that the People’s Bank of China was devalu-
ing the yuan, which did not have a differential effect on U.S. firms relative to other foreign
firms.
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Table 2 presents the stock market return on each of these event dates. We see that
the stock market fell on six of the seven U.S. or China event dates, with a total drop
of 8.9 percent over all of the events. Interestingly, the data provides some evidence of
overshooting—if we start the event window one day before the event and extend the end
of event window (w) to five trading days after the event as in the next column (typically
seven calendar days), the total drop falls in magnitude to only 3.0 percent, and we find
that the stock market actually rose on four out of the seven events. These results suggest
caution about the choice of event dates and the length of the event window. This sensi-
tivity motivates our decision to present results for all event dates (as well as individual
event dates) and all reasonable event windows up to 30 trading days after an event.
Table 2: Stock Returns on Event Dates




US 01Mar18 -1.16 0.28 US announces steel and aluminum tariffs
US 22Mar18 -2.48 -2.70 US orders identification of Chinese products for tariffs
CHN 02Apr18 -2.25 0.39 China to impose tariffs on 128 US exports
CHN 15Jun18 -0.10 -0.53 China retaliates on $50 bn of US imports
OTH 05Jul18 0.88 2.61 Mexico imposes retaliatory tariffs on dozens of US goods
OTH 25Jul18 0.84 -0.08 EU prepares retaliatory tariffs on $20 bn in US goods
US 17Sep18 -0.67 0.32 US announces tariffs on $200 bn goods from China
US 10May19 0.39 -0.70 US raises tariffs from 10 to 25 percent
on $200 bn of Chinese imports
OTH 23May19 -1.29 -4.08 US announces $16 bn bailout to farmers hurt by trade war
OTH 05Aug19 -3.00 -2.48 Chinese currency fell to the lowest point since 2008
CHN 23Aug19 -2.60 0.03 China raises tariffs on soy and autos
US+CHN all -8.87 -2.93
Note: This table shows market returns on and around trade-war announcements that resulted in large numbers of google searches.
“US” refers to events involving an announcement of US tariffs on China; “CHN” refers to events involving Chinese retaliatory tariffs;
and “OTH” refers to trade-war events not concerning U.S. or Chinese tariffs. Rt is the market return (in our sample of firms) on the
day of the announcement.
∑t+5
t−1Rt is the cumulative market return over a 7-day window beginning on the trading day before the
announcement and extending five trading days after the announcement. The total 7-day return for the U.S. and Chinese events in this
table does not exactly equal the value in subsequent tables because we are presenting raw data in this table and double count one day
that appears in two event windows.
Another noteworthy characteristics of the data is that large U.S. firms tend to have
much higher exposure to China than small firms, and they tended to perform substan-
tially worse when the U.S. and China announced tariffs. Table 3 presents data on how
the China exposure variables differ for large firms, where we define large to be the 25,
50, or 100 largest firms in terms of market capitalization. While only 27 percent of all
firms import directly or indirectly from China, 60 of the top 100 firms do. Similarly, while
only 4 percent of listed firms export to China, 16 out of the top 100 firms do. Finally,
we see a similar pattern in terms of how dependent firms are on the Chinese market for
sales. While on average only 2.3 percent of all firm revenues of listed firms come from
the Chinese market, 6.1 percent of revenues for the largest 100 firms come from China.
Since these 100 firms account for 56 percent of total U.S. market capitalization, the size
weighted average of exposure to China is much larger than the simple average.
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Table 3: Large Firms Import from, Export to, and Sell More in China
All Firms Top 25 Top 50 Top 100
Cumulative Share of Market Capitalization 1 0.31 0.43 0.56
Average China Import Dummy 0.27 0.72 0.60 0.60
Average China Export Dummy 0.043 0.20 0.18 0.16
Average China Revenue Share 0.023 0.066 0.086 0.061
Average Non-China Revenue Share 0.16 0.34 0.38 0.34
Note: This table shows selected sample statistics for all firms in our sample as well as firms that are ranked in the top 25, top 50, and
top 100 of all firms in terms of market capitalization.
4 Results
In this section, we first present the results from estimating our factor model and event
study. We then present our estimates of how these trade events affected investment.
4.1 Event Study Results
Using daily stock returns for all trading days between January 1, 2016 and December
31, 2019, we first estimate the number of factors (K) and the resulting factor model in
equation (1) following the approach of Bai and Ng (2002) and Bai and Ng (2013). We
follow Bai and Ng (2002), who recommend choosing the number of factors to minimize
the following loss function when errors may be cross-sectionally correlated:
IC(K) = ln(L(K)) +K
(




where F is the number of firms; L (K) is the log likelihood function based on the esti-
mation of equation (1); N is the number of firms; and T is the number of days. Each
additional factor adds 2,864 βkf parameters (one for each firm). The first factor is similar
to what would be obtained in a classic CAPM setup—its correlation with the total market
return in our data is 0.89. As expected, the typical factor loadings for the first factor are
close to one (β1f = 0.89, with the inter-quartile range between 0.60 and 1.14). Similarly,
our estimates of αf are close to zero (αf = 0.001, with a standard deviation of 0.001). The
first factor accounts for 10.4 percent of the variance, but additional factors account for
much less, with the next four factors accounting for 2.0, 1.6, 1.5, and 1.4 percent of the
variance, respectively. Based on the Bai and Ng (2002) loss function, we use two factors
in our baseline, but also do robustness checks with five factors.
In order to visualize how the various events affected exposed and unexposed firms
(as defined in Table 1), we plot the kernel densities of the 7-day abnormal returns
(CARfj ≡
∑j+5
t=j−1 ˆft) (multiplied by 100) for both sets of firms in Figure 2. On the top
left panel, we see that the distribution of CARs for firms exposed to China over the week
following U.S. tariff announcements is shifted to the left relative to firms that were not
exposed. Similarly, we see that announcements of Chinese tariff retaliation produce a
similar pattern, with the distribution of abnormal returns for exposed firms lying to the
left of the distribution for unexposed firms. The first plot on the second row pools to-
gether all of the U.S.-China tariff events, which is even more shifted to the left. Finally, in
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Note: This figure portrays kernel density plots of cumulative abnormal returns of firms exposed to China (red) and unexposed (black)
during 7-day windows around trade-war announcements. Exposed firms are firms that export to, import from, or have positive
revenues in China.
the lower right panel, we present the densities for other trade war announcements that
did not involve U.S. or Chinese tariff announcements as a placebo test. As we mentioned
in the data section, these events are composed of Mexican or E.U. retaliatory tariff an-
nouncements, the announcement of U.S. farm subsidies, and the Chinese devaluation of
the yuan. We see that on these events exposed firms are associated with somewhat greater
dispersion in CARs, but there is no clear pattern of underperformance. These results sug-
gest that the U.S.-China tariff announcements shifted the distribution of CARs to the left
for firms exposed to China only when the announcements contained information about
U.S. or Chinese tariffs.
We identify the event-study effects on abnormal returns by estimating equation (2),
with w = 5 as our baseline, i.e. a 7-day event window, so that we reduce the scope for
stock-market overshooting to affect our results.9 Table 4 presents the results from regress-
ing the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) on the China exposure variables for each of
the four U.S. tariff events. The estimated coefficients under each event date correspond
to γˆij in equation (2), and we report the average value of these estimated coefficients
across all events in the first column. The coefficients should be interpreted as the aver-
9We discuss alternative window lengths ranging from three to thirty days as robustness checks later in
the paper and show that these do no not qualitatively change the main results.
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age daily effect of the announcement on the returns of exposed firms during the event
window relative to unexposed firms. For example, the coefficient of -0.252 on the China
importer dummy in column 2 implies that during the 7-day event window around the
March 1, 2018 steel and aluminum announcement, firms that imported from China had
abnormal returns that were on average 0.252 percentage points lower than other firms
every day within this 7-day period. Thus, their cumulative abnormal return was -1.764
(= 7× 0.252) percent. Similarly, since the average estimates in column 1 tell us about four
events each composed of seven days, the differential impact of being an importer from
China on stock returns cumulated over all four events is 28 times larger: -2.072 percentage
points (= −0.074× 4× 7).
Table 4: Impact of U.S. Tariffs Announcements (7-Day Windows)
Dep. Var.: ˆft Average 01Mar18 22Mar18 17Sep18 10May19
Steel and China Target $200 Billion 10-25% Tariff
Aluminum Announcement Announcement Increase
Announcement Announcement
China Importer -0.074*** -0.252*** 0.083** -0.025 -0.102**
(0.021) (0.044) (0.038) (0.042) (0.047)
China Exporter -0.023 -0.116* -0.045 0.095 -0.027
(0.035) (0.067) (0.064) (0.085) (0.062)
China Revenue Share -0.619*** 0.253 -0.903*** 0.775*** -2.601***
(0.146) (0.264) (0.279) (0.240) (0.370)
Decomposition of Market Return in Percent
Market Return -3.50 0.28 -3.39 0.32 -0.70
Differential Effect -2.13 -0.99 -0.04 0.26 -1.36
Common Effect -2.69 2.15 -2.62 -0.60 -1.62
Total Event Effect -4.82 1.16 -2.66 -0.34 -2.98
Note: This table presents the results from estimating equation (2). The number of observations is 137,472. The dependent variable
(ˆft) is the abnormal return obtained from estimating the factor model (equation 1) with two factors. China Importer is a dummy that
equals one if the firm or any of its subsidiaries or suppliers imports from China. China Exporter is a dummy that equals one if the firm
or its subsidiaries export to China. China Revenue Share is the share of the firm’s revenue that comes from sales in China. Column
1 presents the the average of the coefficients on each of the event days. Standard errors are in parentheses. In the lower panel of the
table, we report the cumulative market effects as well as the differential and common effects as defined in equation (6). In this lower
panel, the first column is the total (not the average) for all the events.
Table 4 also reveals the important heterogeneity of effects across different event dates
based on estimation of equation (2). This heterogeneity reflects the potential pitfall of as-
suming that all tariff announcements should have similar effects. For example, the March
1, 2018 announcement (widely seen as the start of the trade war) and the May 10, 2019
announcement (which more than doubled tariffs against China) had significant negative
effects on the abnormal returns of importers from China. Other U.S. tariff announce-
ments had insignificant or even positive effects on importers, perhaps revealing that the
announcements were less protectionist than anticipated.
We also see that while there is no robust relationship between U.S. tariff announce-
ments and the abnormal return of firms that exported to China, firms that obtained larger
shares of their revenues from China did have lower returns than other firms. This nega-
tive coefficient on the China Revenue Share variable is likely due to three (not mutually
exclusive) reasons. The first is that the the China revenue share variable (which includes
the share of revenues due to exports) may be picking up the impact of announcements
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on exporters. Second, market participants may have anticipated that U.S. tariffs may pro-
voke Chinese retaliatory tariffs and non-tariff barriers that could lower revenues obtained
either by exporting or multinational sales. Third, it is also possible that U.S. tariffs weak-
ened the Chinese economy, which could lower profits for U.S. firms selling there. The
average estimated effect is also economically significant. For example as we saw in Ta-
ble 3, the average share of revenues from China for a firm in the top 100 was 0.061. The
coefficient on China revenue share in the first column of Table 4 implies that these firms
had an average abnormal return of -0.038 (= −0.619 × 0.061) every day during all of the
U.S. tariff events. Therefore, the cumulative abnormal return for these firms was 28 times
higher: -1.06 percentage points.
Table 5: Impact of Chinese Tariff Announcements (7-Day Windows)
Dep. Var.: ˆft Average 02Apr18 15Jun18 23Aug19
China $128 Bln China $50 Bln China Soy/Auto
Announcement Announcement Announcement
China Importer 0.046* 0.027 -0.046 0.158***
(0.025) (0.039) (0.044) (0.044)
China Exporter -0.056 0.059 -0.183*** -0.045
(0.037) (0.057) (0.063) (0.069)
China Revenue Share -0.825*** -0.417 -1.699*** -0.360
(0.144) (0.270) (0.244) (0.230)
Decomposition of Market Return in Percent
Market Return -0.80 -0.29 -0.53 0.03
Differential Effect -0.48 0.01 -0.95 0.46
Common Effect -0.67 -0.44 0.73 -0.95
Total Event Effect -1.15 -0.43 -0.23 -0.50
Note: This table presents the results from estimating equation (2). The number of observations is 137,472. The dependent variable
(ˆft) is the abnormal return obtained from estimating the factor model (equation 1) with two factors. China Importer is a dummy that
equals one if the firm or any of its subsidiaries or suppliers imports from China. China Exporter is a dummy that equals one if the
firm or its subsidiaries export to China. China Revenue Share is the share of the firm’s revenue that comes from sales in China. The
average is the the average of the coefficients on each of the event days. Standard errors are in parentheses. In the lower panel of the
table, we report the cumulative market decline as well as the differential and common effects as defined in equation (6). In this lower
panel, the first column is the total (not the average) for all the events.
Table 5 presents analogous regressions estimated using data for the three Chinese tar-
iff retaliation events. As with the U.S. tariff events, we also find substantial heterogeneity
in the effects of the events on the returns for firms. We see no significant negative effects
from Chinese retaliation on U.S. importers and mixed impacts on exporters and firms sell-
ing in China. Not surprisingly, announcements of Chinese retaliation are not associated
with lower abnormal returns for U.S. importers, but we do see consistent negative abnor-
mal returns for firms selling in China when China announces retaliation. These returns
are significant and negative on average as one can see in the first column. The average
daily effect (-0.825) implies that the one hundred largest firms in terms of market capital-
ization (which had a China Revenue Share of 0.061) experienced a -2.5 percentage point
abnormal return due to their exposure to the Chinese market. Interestingly, only the June
15, 2018 Chinese retaliation appears to have significantly lowered the returns for firms
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exporting to China.
In the lower panel of the tables, we use equation (6) to decompose the aggregate mar-
ket return into the differential and common effects, with the results in the first column
corresponding to cumulative (not average) effect over all events. As one can see from Ta-
ble 4, the U.S. stock market fell a total of 3.5 percent during the four 7-day event windows
around the U.S. tariff announcements about China. The differential returns of firms ex-
posed to China account for a 2.13 percentage point decline, and the common effect drove
markets down another 2.69 percentage points on those days. These two declines total 4.82
percentage points, which is 1.32 percentage points larger than the aggregate, which im-
plies that idiosyncratic factors uncorrelated with the information in the announcements
pushed markets up by 1.32 percentage points. Much of this difference is driven by the
underlying market trend in the market (Rα (5)). The period between the first trading day
in 2016 and the last trading day in 2019 was one of remarkable stock price increases with
the Wilshire 5000 rising 66 percent. The four events with 7-day windows in our sam-
ple contain 28 trading days, which on average experienced a substantial upward drift as
measured by Rα (5). In our sample, this drift amounts to 2.00 percentage points, which
implies that if one had randomly picked 28 days in the sample with no information or
events perturbing the market (i.e., δkt = Zif = θt = 0), one should have expected the stock
market to have risen by 2.00 percentage points. The fact that the market only rose 1.32
percentage points after netting out the impact of the tariff announcements, implies that
the time-varying idiosyncratic firm-specific component (RI (5)) only amounted to -0.68
percentage points. (= 1.32− 2.00). Thus, virtually all of the stock market movement dur-
ing these event windows can be accounted for by the underlying market drift (Rα (5)),
the differential effect (RD (5)), and the common effect (RC (5)).
The heterogeneity of the estimated common and differential effects will play an im-
portant role in understanding the impact of the trade war on investment. Consider the
first two U.S. tariff announcements which occurred within the first quarter of 2018. We
estimate that jointly they drove down stock prices by 3.22 percentage points. Of this drop,
1.03 percentage points can be attributed to the differential lower returns of firms exposed
to China. However, the common effects of these announcements almost completely can-
cel (2.15-2.62=-0.47). Thus, when we turn to estimating the impact of the trade war on
investment, we should only expect to see the differential effect having much of an impact
from those two announcements. Similarly, the absence of a large differential or common
effect following the September 17, 2018 announcement, means that we shouldn’t expect
much of an impact from this announcement on investment either. By contrast, the May
10, 2019 announcement appears to have had economically large impacts on equity prices
due to the common effect and by driving down the relative share prices of exposed firms.
This feature of our methodology highlights the fact that we do not bias our results by
erroneously including irrelevant events because irrelevant events should yield estimated
differential and common effects that are close to zero.
Turning to the aggregate estimated stock market impacts of Chinese retaliation in Ta-
ble 5, we see similar heterogeneity. Overall, the markets declined by only 0.8 percent
during these three event windows, and the differential and common effects both only
account for a fraction of a percentage point movement. The only Chinese tariff retal-
iation event that seems to have moved the market substantially was the June 15, 2018
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announcement. While the common effect pushed the market up by 0.73 percent follow-
ing this announcement, differentially poor abnormal returns by firms exposed to China
dragged overall returns down by 0.95 percentage points following the retaliation. Thus,
the net effect is small.
Table 6: Decomposition by Length of Event Window and Type of Announcement
All Events U.S. Events China Events
w R(w) RC(w) RD(w) R(w) RC(w) RD(w) R(w) RC(w) RD(w)
1 -9.74 -6.57 -1.75 -8.63 -5.58 -1.31 -1.11 -0.99 -0.44
(0.34) (0.34) (0.28) (0.28) (0.21) (0.19)
5 -4.29 -3.36 -2.61 -3.50 -2.69 -2.13 -0.80 -0.67 -0.48
(0.44) (0.47) (0.34) (0.36) (0.28) (0.27)
10 -2.24 -4.50 -1.76 -5.16 -5.19 -3.25 2.92 0.68 1.49
(0.70) (0.59) (0.44) (0.51) (0.47) (0.40)
30 -5.74 -18.22 -0.76 -10.53 -14.94 -3.55 5.75 -2.41 2.79
(0.97) (0.70) (0.61) (0.82) (0.60) (0.77)
Note: R (w), RC (w), and RD (w) equal the total stock-market percentage decline, the decline due to the common effect, and the
decline due to differential effects as defined in equation (6). Since the event window always starts one day before the event the length
of the event window is w + 2, where w is the number of days after the event included in the window. These effects are defined in
equation (6). Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses.
Thus far, we have not addressed the statistical significance of the estimated impact
of the common and differential effects given in equation (6). Because these estimates are
based on thousands of coefficients arising from the factor model, it is difficult to compute
them analytically. We therefore estimate them by bootstrapping the sample of firms 200
times, and then recomputing all parameters and estimates for a variety of event window
lengths. We present these results in Table 6. The first set of three columns of this table
presents the results for all U.S. and China tariff events, and the other sets of columns sep-
arates the events into those corresponding to U.S. and Chinese tariff announcements. The
first column in each set of events (R (w)) gives us the cumulative market movement dur-
ing the event window. In all cases we see that R (1) is less than R (5), which is consistent
with the overshooting we saw when just comparing 3- and 7-day event windows. When
we look at events extending 30 days past the announcement (R (30)), we see that returns
drift even more negatively for U.S. tariff announcements and positively for Chinese tariff
announcements, but on net the fall is quite similar to what we see using a 7-day window
(R (5)).
The estimates for the differential effect (RD (w)) are fairly stable for all window lengths
as we saw in Figure 3. For values of w ranging from 1 to 10 (i.e., event window lengths of
three to 12 days), the differential effect ranges between -1.75 and -2.61 when we include
all events. It also is significantly negative for all values of w through 10. U.S. tariff an-
nouncements have significant negative differential effects on exposed firms for all event
windows. As before, we see that Chinese tariff announcements have small differential ef-
fects, and these are not always significant and can flip sign when we have event windows
exceeding five trading days after an announcement. Not surprisingly, the event window
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length seems to matter the most when estimating the common effect since stock-market
movements over long horizons are likely to also reflect information unrelated to the trade
war. Since the sum of the common and differential effects are more negative on average
when we use event windows of 3 or 12 days (w = 1 or 10), we focus on our most conser-
vative estimate of 7 days (w = 5) in the next section, noting that we can estimate more
negative impacts if we chose event windows of 1, 10, or 30 days after an announcement.
We will continue to make our baseline w = 5—i.e., a 7-day window—for three reasons.
First, this choice maintains a short enough event window so that we can plausibly argue
that the major news was due to the event. Second, it is long enough to limit the potential
impact of stock-market overshooting. And third, it enables us to be conservative about
the total effect of the U.S.-China tariff announcements.
4.1.1 Robustness
Next, we explore the robustness of these results. First, we explore how the positive corre-
lation of the China revenue share variable with the import and exporting dummies that
we discussed in Section 3 affects the results. We re-estimate our baseline specifications
without the China revenue share variable and report the coefficient averages for the U.S.
and Chinese events in columns 1 and 2 of Table 7. Dropping the revenue share vari-
able increases the magnitude of the estimated negative effect that U.S. tariffs have on U.S.
importers and Chinese tariffs have on U.S. exporters. Shutting down this channel of expo-
sure reduces the magnitude of the estimated differential effect of the stock-market decline
from 2.61 percentage points to 1.47 percentage points (when we sum across all U.S. and
China events), respectively, but increases the magnitude of the decline due to the com-
mon effect from 3.36 percentage points to 3.84 percentage points. Overall, though, the
aggregate impact of the tariff announcements on stock prices is little changed: the total
effect falls in magnitude from -5.97 percent in our preferred specification to -5.31 percent
when we shut down the differential impact of the trade war on firms selling in China.
Second, we consider the effect of changing the event window from seven to three
days (i.e., the day before, the day of, and the day after). A shorter event window is more
common in the literature and constitutes our main alternative specification. In order to
save space, we do not report the results for each event date—they are presented in the
appendix—and instead present the averages of the coefficients in columns 3 and 4 of Ta-
ble 7. We see two important differences with the baseline results. First, the market moved
much more in 3-day windows around events relative to 7-day windows, presumably be-
cause short-lived uncertainty or other factors caused the market to overshoot after the
initial announcements. The cumulative market decline for the seven events in Tables 4
and 5 equals 9.74 percentage points: more than two times larger than the cumulative de-
cline we measured using 7-day windows (4.3 percentage points). The results also provide
an explanation for why the market partially recovered after the initial announcements:
the downward effect of the common effect was much smaller. While the common ef-
fect drove markets down by 3.36 percentage points when using a 7-day window—2.69
percentage points on U.S. announcement days and 0.67 percentage points on Chinese
announcement days—it drove markets down by 6.57 percentage points when we shift
to 3-day windows (as one can see by summing together the common effect estimates in
columns 3 and 4 of Table 7). By contrast, the differential effect becomes slightly less im-
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Table 7: Robustness Tests: Collinearity, Event Windows, and Placebo Tests
Average of Coefficients
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
China Importer -0.094*** 0.020 -0.076** 0.008 -0.038 -0.063***
(0.021) (0.024) (0.034) (0.038) (0.023) (0.017)
China Exporter -0.027 -0.061* -0.080 -0.074 0.014 -0.018
(0.035) (0.037) (0.056) (0.050) (0.041) (0.025)
China Revenue Share -1.097*** -0.868*** 0.253 0.481***
(0.207) (0.246) (0.171) (0.108)
N 137,472 137,472 60,144 60,144 80,192 100,240
w 5 5 1 1 5 5
Events U.S. China U.S. China Other 5 Largest
Declines 2017
Decomposition of Market Return in Percent
Market Return -3.49 -0.81 -8.63 -1.11 -4.04 -7.90
Differential Effect -1.56 0.09 -1.31 -0.44 -0.19 -0.49
Common Effect -2.93 -0.91 -5.58 -0.99 -7.64 -9.61
Total Event Effect -4.50 -0.83 -6.89 -1.43 -7.83 -10.10
Note: This table presents the average coefficient on each of the event days obtained from estimating equation (2) with two factors.
Coefficients for each event corresponding to the specifications in columns 1 and 3 can be found in Appendix Tables A.2 and A.3. The
dependent variable (ˆft) is the abnormal return obtained from estimating the factor model (equation 1). China Importer is a dummy
that equals one if the firm or any of its subsidiaries or suppliers imports from China. China Exporter is a dummy that equals one if
the firm or its subsidiaries export to China. China Revenue Share is the share of the firm’s revenue that comes from sales in China.
Standard errors are in parentheses. In the lower panel of the table, we report the cumulative market decline as well as the differential
and common effects as defined in equation (6). In this lower panel, the first column is the total (not the average) for all the events.
portant as we shorten the event window. Firms exposed to China had stock returns that
were 1.75 percentage points lower than unexposed firms using a 3-day window, but their
returns were 2.61 percentage points lower when we shift to 7-day windows. In order to
be conservative and not allow this overshooting to cause us to overstate the impact of the
tariffs, we therefore will focus on the 7-day windows, but we estimate even larger effects
using 3-day windows as a robustness check.
Third, we conduct a series of placebo tests to make sure that the effects we identify do
not appear when we estimate the model using non-tariff events. We first check that there
is no differential effect on China-exposed firms during trade war announcements unre-
lated to China. We rerun our event study using the four trade-war announcements listed
in Table 2 that are not associated with escalating U.S. or Chinese tariffs, but instead due
to events like Mexico or EU retaliation. The results, presented in column 5, indicate that
none of our China exposure variables are significantly associated with abnormal returns
arising from events not linked to U.S.-China tariff announcements. The differential effect
accounts for only 0.19 percentage points of the 4.04 percentage point drop in the market
around these days. However, we do see a large negative effect arising from the common
effect. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that escalations in the trade war with
countries other than China did lower markets due to heightened policy uncertainty and
other common factors, but these announcements did not have any differential effect on
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firms exposed to China.
We run a second placebo test to examine the hypothesis that our selection of announce-
ments was driven by large stock-market declines. If this were true, one should expect to
see differential effects in response to other large, negative movements in stock markets. In
the last column of Table 7, we run our specification using the five largest one-day declines
in 2017 as our event dates. While there is evidence that importers on average performed
significantly worse on these days, there is no significant association with exporters, and
the firms selling in China actually performed better. On net, these effects tend to cancel
producing only a small differential effect. The cumulative decline on these days was 7.90
percent, but the contribution of the event component was only -0.49 percentage points:
only 6 percent of the total. The small contribution of the event component indicates that
differential returns of firms exposed to China did not contribute substantially to overall
market declines when the market moved substantially for reasons other than trade pol-
icy. Similarly, the large negative value for the common effect also makes sense—if we
pick events on the basis of sharp market movements on those days, we are likely picking
events in which some common factor depressed stock prices.
Table 8 presents results for a number of additional robustness checks. First, it is pos-
sible that import-competing firms in protected industries benefited from the tariffs. To
test this hypothesis, we include a dummy variable in the regression that is one if the U.S.
applied a tariff in the North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) 6-digit
sector listed for the firm.10 The results, reported in column 1, indicate that there is no
significant relationship between stock returns and being in a protected industry. These
results are largely in line with Egger and Zhu (2019) who using a different sample of
events and different method of constructing abnormal returns also found weakly nega-
tive relationships between U.S. protection and abnormal returns of U.S. firms.
We also considered robustness to various other omitted variables. For example, firms
exposed to China tend to be large, multinationals, so it is possible that these characteristics
of the firms are driving the results. In columns 2 and 3, we re-estimate our specifications
for U.S. and Chinese tariff events with a “Large Company” dummy that is one if the com-
pany has more than 1000 employees. As one can see from the table, the estimates of the
coefficients of interest are only slightly affected and the coefficient on size is insignificant.
It also could be the case that our China Revenue Share variable is picking up an effect
arising from being a multinational, not just a firm that sells in China. If the U.S.-China
trade war affected all multinationals equally, we would expect that including the share
of a firm’s sales arising from sales in foreign countries other than China to matter in our
event study. We therefore report the results from this specification in columns 4 and 5
of the table. As one can see from these results, multinationals that had sales to countries
10We set the industry protected dummy equal to 1 if a 6-digit NAICS industry was subject to a new tariff.
We identified these industries for each of the four U.S. tariff announcement events combining information
on the HTS10 tariff affected industry with a new tariff with a mapping from HTS10 to NAICS. The affected
industries were easily identified for all of the US tariff announcements except the 3/22/18 event which
was the announcement that US orders identification of Chinese products for tariffs. For this event, we set
the dummy equal to one for all 6-digit NAICS industries where the 2017 share of China imports in total
consumption was at least 10 percent, and zero otherwise. Note there was no shipments data available for
NAICS industries starting with 11 (logging) and special codes (starting with 9) so these are set to zero.
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Table 8: Robustness Tests: Omitted Variables and Factors
Average of Coefficients
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
China Importer -0.064*** -0.071*** 0.036 -0.068*** 0.035 -0.054** 0.025
(0.023) (0.022) (0.025) (0.022) (0.026) (0.021) (0.024)
China Exporter -0.017 -0.018 -0.061 -0.019 -0.065* -0.014 -0.078**
(0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.035) (0.037) (0.035) (0.036)
China Revenue Share -0.556*** -0.633*** -0.870*** -0.557*** -0.956*** -0.608*** -0.805***
(0.153) (0.149) (0.146) (0.157) (0.159) (0.145) (0.143)
Industry Protected -0.065
(0.074)
Large Company -0.032 -0.043
(0.035) (0.047)
Non-China
Revenue Share -0.048 0.100*
(0.051) (0.060)
N 137,472 121,392 121,392 137,472 137,472 137,472 137,472
Events U.S. U.S. China U.S. China U.S. China
Number of Factors 2 2 2 2 2 5 5
Decomposition of Market Return in Percent
Market Return -3.19 -2.24 -1.00 -3.53 -0.76 -3.51 -0.79
Differential Effect -1.86 -2.09 -0.66 -2.33 -0.17 -1.77 -0.77
Common Effect -2.53 -1.74 -0.59 -2.58 -0.85 -3.11 -0.35
Total Event Effect -4.39 -3.84 -1.25 -4.92 -1.02 -4.88 -1.12
Note: This table presents the average coefficient on each of the event days obtained from estimating equation (2). The dependent
variable (ˆft) is the abnormal return obtained from estimating the factor model (equation 1). China Importer is a dummy that equals
one if the firm or any of its subsidiaries or suppliers imports from China. China Exporter is a dummy that equals one if the firm or its
subsidiaries export to China. China Revenue Share is the share of the firm’s revenue that comes from sales in China. Large Company
is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm has 1000 or more employees. Non-China Revenue Share is the share of the firm’s revenues that
comes from foreign companies other than China. Industry Protected is a dummy equal to one in the 6-digit NAICS industry that has
a new tariff applied in the event window. Standard errors are in parentheses. In the lower panel of the table, we report the cumulative
market decline as well as the differential and common effects as defined in equation (6). In this lower panel, the first column is the
total (not the average) for all the events.
other than China did not fare significantly worse than firms with no sales outside the U.S,
which indicates that the key driver of the negative CARs is the firm’s exposure to China.
So far, all of the results have been drawn on a two factor model that was based on
the Bai and Ng (2002) procedure, but it is possible that we may have underestimated
the number of relevant factors. To check the sensitivity of our results to the number of
factors, we re-estimated the factor model using five factors and report the results in the
last two columns. Using more factors seems to slightly strengthen the results: yielding
a negative and significant relationship between Chinese retaliation an export status and
slightly raising the estimated common effect.
Finally, we check how robust our results are to varying the length of the event win-
dow. To do this, we recomputed the decomposition given in equation (6) for every value
of w between 1 and 30 (corresponding to event windows ranging between 3 and 32 trad-
ing days). We present these results in Figure 3. The first panel in the figure shows the
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results of using all of the U.S.-China tariff events. As before, we see that the common
effect is negative and large in magnitude in short event windows, reflecting the sharp
overall drop in the market around the announcements. However, the common effect
rises in magnitude to -5 percentage points about two days after the event and stays at
approximately this level until about 15 days after the event. Thereafter, it drifts off, which
probably reflects the fact that our identifying assumption—that the tariff announcements
were the main source of information about stock prices—is less plausible as we move
several weeks away from any announcement. Interestingly, the differential contribution
is remarkably stable over all window lengths. This stability implies that firms that were
exposed to China experienced differentially lower stock returns following U.S.-China tar-
iff announcements and these persisted for at least 30 trading days afterwards.











Note: This figure shows the estimated percentage point decline overall market returns for various event window lengths due to the
common effect of U.S.-China tariff announcements (RC (w)) and information that differentially affected the returns of exposed firms
(RD (w)). Since the event window always starts one day before the event the length of the event window is w + 2, where w is the
number of days after the event included in the window. These effects are defined in equation (6).
In sum, our stock-market decomposition reveals that U.S. tariff announcements that
targeted China are associated with persistent declines in the stock returns of firms that
were exposed to China. Importantly, these results only reflect the impact of the unantici-
pated component of the announcement. To the extent that markets anticipated the trade
war announcements, we omit them from our analysis. Thus, the aggregate effect may
be even larger. Finally, although we do not see much evidence of Chinese retaliation an-
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nouncements substantially affecting U.S. market values, the U.S. events are large enough
to have driven substantial declines in overall U.S. market value. We explore the impact
of these effects on q and investment in the next section.
4.2 Investment Results
In this section, we show a causal effect of the trade war on U.S. investment of listed firms,
using the event component of the stock-price changes. To this end, we begin this analysis
by reproducing the standard IK result in levels (equation (8)) using ordinary least squares
(OLS) with firm and time fixed effects to allow for differences in the rates of firm-level
depreciation and changes in the cost of capital. In column 1 of Table 9, we report results
based on our structural equation and see that lagged MTB values are significantly linked
to movements in investment rates when estimated using the same time period as in our
factor model (2016Q1-2019Q4). The coefficient on our proxy for q, the market-to-book
value, is 0.013 and statistically significant. It is standard in the literature to also include
cash flow relative to the lagged capital stock to the regression to account for possible non-
classical measurement error in our measure of q or the possibility that some firms may
be credit constrained. We do so in column 2 and subsequent specifications. Controlling
for cash flow lowers the coefficient on MTB to a statistically significant estimate of 0.012.
These results are consistent with the Abel and Panageas (2020) finding that in the presence
of non-classical measurement error and financial constraints, the coefficient on MTB is
biased upwards when one does not control for cash flow and biased downwards when
one does. Thus, the true estimate should lie between these two bounds. 11
We use equations (15) and (17) to estimate ψ−1 in the case of either classical measure-
ment error or an endogeneity bias arising from a correlation between MTB value and the
error term. This requires us to run the investment rate specification in differences. Be-
cause our instrument is lagged four quarters, we can only run the instrumental variables
specification over the period 2017Q4-2019Q4. In column 3, we show that a 4-quarter dif-
ferenced OLS specification (equation 15) run over this shorter sample period results in
similar estimates of the coefficient on MTB value (ψ̂−1) as in the levels specification. The
next column of Table 9 presents the results from estimating ψ−1 using instrumental vari-
ables, where we use equation (16) to construct our instruments: the lagged common and
differential effects of the firm’s stock return in a quarter (r˜Gf,s−4 and r˜Df,s−4), the lagged
idiosyncratic component (ν˜f,s−4), and the lagged component of returns not explained by
the event (r˙f,s−4). Comparing the IV estimate of ψ−1 in column 4 with the OLS levels
specification in column 2 or the first-differenced specification in column 3 reveals that all
specifications yield similar estimates of ψ−1.
The results also indicate that our instruments are strong and valid. From the middle
panel, we see that the first stage F-statistic is 1,635, which is significant at all conventional
levels, indicating that we have strong instruments. Since we have four instruments for the
change in MTB, we can test the validity of our instrument set. The instruments pass the
over-identification test. Moreover, the coefficients on the common and differential effects
11For example, in their classic paper, Fazzari et al. (1988) obtained estimates of ψ−1 ranging from 0.0008
and 0.0046 depending on the firm type. More recently, Peters and Taylor (2017) using annual data from
1975 to 2011, obtain estimates for ψ−1 ranging from 0.017 to 0.035
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OLS OLS OLS IV IV Cumulant
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)




∆4MTBf,s−4 0.012∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
∆4 (Cashflowfs/Kf,s−4) 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N 30,780 29,698 16,522 14,390 14,390 21,615
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Overid J-testχ2 5.87 3.51
[p value] [ 0.12] [ 0.06]
Weak IV F-test 1,635.0 6,504.7











First stage F-test 1,635 6,505
[p-value] [ 0.00] [ 0.00]
Notes: If,s/Kf,s−4 is the firm’s quarterly capital expenditures (investment) relative to its 4-quarter lagged
capital stock; ∆4(If,s/Kf,s−4) is the 4-quarter change in this variable, MTBfs is the firm’s market-to-book
value, and Cashflowf,s/Kf,s−4 is the firm’s cash flow divided by its lagged capital stock. Variables are cleaned
on top and bottom 1 percentiles. As defined in equation (16), r˜Gf,s−4 and r˜Df,s−4 are the lagged 4-quarter
movement in returns due to the common and differential effects; ν˜f,s−4 is the lagged 4-quarter movement in
returns due to idiosyncratic shocks; and r˙f,s−4 is defined in equation (17); and r˜f,s−4 is the lagged 4-quarter
movement in returns. The coefficient on cashflow in first stage is not reported. Column 6 implements the
Peters and Taylor (2017) estimation procedure in which KTf,s−4 incorporates tangible and intangible capital and
a cumulant estimator is used.
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(r˜Gf,s−4 and r˜Df,s−4), which correspond to our estimates of λC and λD in equation (17), are
precisely estimated, indicating that the stock price movements induced by the various
U.S.-China tariff actions affected exposed firms’ MTBs. The point estimates for λC and
λD are 1.25 and 3.21, respectively, which indicates that for a firm with the mean value of
MTB (1.82) that a one percent drop in stock prices due to the common effect lowers MTB
values by 0.69 percent while a one percent drop in share prices due to the differential
effect lowers MTB values by 1.7 percent. This establishes that movements in stock returns
due to the trade war affect firms’ MTB, which in turn affects firms’ investment rates. In
column 5, we estimate an alternative specification in which we use the abnormal return,
i.e. the error from the factor model (r˜f,s−4), as an instrument. This also yields a very
similar point estimate for ψ̂−1 as we obtained before.12
Column 6 of the table replicates the method introduced by Peters and Taylor (2017)
to estimate ψ−1. This approach introduces a number of innovations relative to stan-
dard ones. First, the dependent variable is no longer investment divided by the lagged
book value of property, plant and equipment, but is now investment divided by phys-
ical and intangible capital, which incorporates intellectual property investments (e.g.,
R&D) patents, goodwill, etc. as intangible assets.13 In addition, this specification also fol-
lows Peters and Taylor (2017) in using the cumulant estimator proposed by Erickson and
Whited (2002) and Erickson et al. (2014)). The results from this procedure are presented
in column 6 of Table 9. As one can see, the estimate of ψ−1 is larger, but the difference
with the previous estimates is not always significant. However, this higher point esti-
mate in combination with the fact that the sum of physical and intangible capital exceeds
the value of just physical capital, would result in a larger aggregate investment impact
using equation (18) Therefore, in order to remain conservative, about the impact, we will
continue to base our estimate of ψ−1 on the value in column 4.
We use equation (18) to compute the implied aggregate effect of these declines as a
share of total investment by listed firms and present the results in Figure 4. The plot
shows the results of estimating the investment impact given in equation (18) using our
baseline estimates for ψ−1, λC , and λD from column 4 of Table 9. The effect of the trade war
does not reach its maximal impact until the end of 2020. In our estimation framework,
the impact of tariff announcements on stock prices affects investment four quarters later.
Thus, the opening salvos of the trade war in March of 2018 would not have affected in-
vestment until the first quarter of 2019. As we saw in Tables 4 and 5, the initial two March
announcements of U.S. tariffs produced significant negative differential returns for firms
exposed to China, but the common effects almost completely canceled each other. Sim-
ilarly, Chinese retaliation in April and the U.S. announcement in September of that year
had little effect on the market, and we estimate only modest impacts of these announce-
ments on the returns of firms in general or those exposed to China. Thus, most of the
impact of the trade war on returns to capital in 2018 was driven by the two March 2018
U.S. tariff announcements, and these mainly affected equity markets by driving down
12We also checked for heterogeneous ψ̂−1 across different sized firms, but did not find any significant
differences.
13We measure intangible capital using the same method as the one described in Appendix B of Peters
and Taylor (2017).
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the returns of firms exposed to China. Four quarters later, the lower returns to capital
for exposed firms reduced their incentives to invest and this fact accounts for why the
figure shows a drop in 4-quarter investment growth in the fourth quarter of 2019 of 0.3
percentage points.

























2019Q1 2019Q2 2019Q3 2019Q4 2020Q1 2020Q2 2020Q3 2020Q4
Differential Effect Common Effect Total Event Effect
Note: The figure shows the estimated 4-quarter percentage point decline in investment growth due to the differential and common
effect of the trade war based on the estimates from Table 9, column 4, and equation (18).
The larger decline at the end of 2020 can be understood by referring back to our event
study results in Tables 4 and 5 where we identified two important escalations in 2019:
the May 2019 increase in U.S. tariffs and the Chinese tariff retaliation announcement in
August of 2019. The estimates in Table 4 column 5 indicate that the U.S. announcement
caused the U.S. market to fall by 2.98 percentage points over a one week window: 1.62
percent due to the common effect and 1.36 percent due to differentially poor performance
of firms exposed to China. We estimate that the impact of this announcement did not
appear in investment numbers until the second quarter of 2020, which accounts for the
steep drop in our estimated impact of the tariff announcements on investment in the
latter half of 2020. Similarly, the August 2019 Chinese retaliation announcement was
associated with another large negative common effect (and a mild positive differential
effect), which we estimate will further depress the rate of investment growth by close to
two percentage points in the third and fourth quarters of 2020. By the the fourth quarter
of 2020, when managers will have had a chance to fully revise their investment decisions
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in light of all of the 2019 announcements, we estimate that investment growth will be
another 1.6 percentage points lower than without the tariff-induced market movements
of 2019. Combining the effects of the 2018 and 2019 announcements implies that the U.S.-
China trade war will lower investment in our sample of firms by a total of 1.9 percentage
points by the fourth quarter of 2020.14
5 Conclusion
This paper develops a method of quantifying the impact of policy announcements on in-
vestment rates that makes use of stock market data. We use the fact that by using short
event windows around trade policy announcements, we can both identify the total effect
of an announcement and the differential effect on exposed firms to show how we can de-
compose the impact of an announcement into the “common effect” (i.e., the contribution
explainable by factors that matter in general) and the differential effect (the contribution
explainable by the differential behavior of treated firms). When we apply this theory to
the U.S.-China trade war announcements in 2018 and 2019, we find that U.S. and Chi-
nese tariff announcements lowered U.S. aggregate equity prices in our sample of close to
3,000 listed firms by 6.0 percentage points: a $1.7 trillion reduction in market value for
our sample of listed firms.
We embed these estimates into a q theory of investment setup in which market-to-book
values equal the shadow value of capital. We show that policy-induced reductions in firm
share prices lowered U.S. MTB values and these lowered investment rates in our sample
of firms. Adverse common factors (e.g., lower macroeconomic growth rates, heightened
policy uncertainty, etc.) accounted for half of this fall and the other half was due to the
differentially poor performance of firms exposed to China.
Our q model implies that the effect of these declines in market values take time to
appear in investment numbers. Since many of the most significant market declines due
to the trade war did not appear until the second and third quarters of 2019, their effects
will only appear in the middle of 2020. Our estimates indicate that investment growth
among listed firms was lowered by 0.3 percentage points in the fourth quarter of 2019,
but the depressing effect of the the U.S.-China will shave another 1.6 percentage points
off the investment growth rate of listed firms, resulting in a 1.9 percentage point decline
over the two years.
There are several caveats to this analysis that should be mentioned. The first is that
we only have data for listed firms. This means that the national impact might be more
negative if unlisted firms, e.g. farmers, were also adversely affected on average or less
negative if the tariffs caused new entry into protected sectors like steel and aluminum.
The second is that we only have data for U.S. firms. A large amount of investment in
the U.S. is conducted by foreign multinationals that are listed on other exchanges, which
are therefore excluded from our analysis. Many of these foreign multinationals were also
adversely affected by the trade war, but these effects, which would matter for the U.S. as
a whole, were left out the analysis. Third, we can only estimate the impact of the unan-
14Switching to 3-day window produces a larger estimated effect in 2019 and a smaller one in 2020, but
the cumulative decline over 2019 and 2020 is actually slightly larger—a decline of 2.0 percentage points by
the fourth quarter of 2020.
31
ticipated component of the announcements. This means that to the extent that markets
anticipated the trade war, we are likely to have underestimated the effects. Finally, our
analysis only focuses on trade-war announcements related to U.S.-China tariffs largely
because we were constrained to focus on seaborne trade. This means that we do not in-
clude other important trade war announcements (e.g., retaliation by countries other than
China or actions against specific Chinese companies like Huawei). We leave addressing
these additional effects to future research.
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A.1 Introduction
This online appendix contains supplementary theoretical and empirical results. Section
A.2 presents the method we use to decompose returns into those attributable to U.S. and
Chinese events. Section A.3 the derivation of equation (7), and Section A.4 presents sam-
ple statistics. Section A.5 presents additional results obtained by varying our assump-
tions and estimation procedures. In Section A.5.1, we present the results of using a 3-day
window in our event studies and varying the number of factors. Section A.5.2 presents es-
timates of ψ−1 and λ based on alternative event windows and numbers of factors. It also
presents a reduced-form estimate of the impact of stock prices on investment. Finally,
Section A.5.3 presents the data underlying Figure 4.
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A.2 Accounting for Aggregate Stock-Market Impacts of
U.S. and Chinese Events
If we want to split the events into U.S. and Chinese tariff events, we can do a decompo-






























where we have RDt = RUt + RCt . One issue with this further decomposition is that for
sufficiently large values of w, event windows can overlap. However, we can handle this
problem by defining the market return during U.S. events (RUEt ) and the market return
during Chinese events (RCEt ) as











These definitions attribute the market return on an overlapping day to 1/2 of the move-
ments to the common effect plus the differential effect due to the event. Note that
Rt = RCEt + RUEt . Similarly, whenever we split the common effect by country, we can
decompose the common effect as follows:






so that RCt ≡ RUGt + RCGt . It will also be the case that we can rewrite equation (5) for
the case where we split the events into those due to U.S. and China announcements as
follows:
Rt ≡ Rαt +RCCt +RUCt +RCt +RUt +RIt . (A.5)
We can compute the market return, differential effect and common effect so that these




RXj+` for X ∈ {U,UE,UC,C,CE,CC} . (A.6)
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A.3 Derivation of Equation (7)
We assume that at the start of any period (which in our empirical work will correspond
to a quarter) s, managers in firm f produce based on the firm’s existing capital stock, Kfs.
This production yields a flow of revenues equal to Afsg (Kfs, Lfs), where Afs captures the
firm’s productivity (and output price), and Lfs is labor.1 Firms then choose an amount to
be invested, Ifs, and pay the remainder to shareholders in the form of dividends. Thus,
the amount of dividends to be paid out at the start of the period is given by
pifs = Afsg (Kfs, Lfs)− wsLfs − psIfs − c (Ifs, Kfs) , (A.7)
where ws is the wage; ps is the cost of the investment good; and c (Ifs, Kfs) is the adjust-
ment cost associated with increasing or decreasing the firm’s capital stock.
In this formulation, it costs ps to purchase investment goods (i.e., investment that pro-
cures capital to replace the depreciated amount), but there is an additional “adjustment”
cost to produce output with more or less capital than in the previous period. We assume
that the adjustment cost function is given by









where ψ is some positive parameter that represents how costly it is for firms to adjust their
capital stock from the one in the previous period. If ψ = 0, we are in a frictionless world in
which capital stocks adjust instantly to the optimal level, so the shadow value of capital
equals the cost of investment of goods (i.e., qfs = ps). In contrast, if ψ is infinite, firms are
unable to adjust their capital stocks (as in the specific-factors model), and movements in
the returns to capital will not affect investment. In general, we expect that 0 < ψ < ∞.
The firm’s capital stock (Kfs) in period s evolves according to the following equation:
Kf,s+1 = (1− ρf )Kfs + Ifs, (A.9)
where ρf is the rate of depreciation, which we allow to vary by firm.
Firms maximize the present discounted value of profits. The owners of the firm at the
beginning of the period receive a dividend equal to whatever revenues are not reinvested







pif` = pifs +
Vfs+1
1 + r , (A.10)
where Vfs equals the stock market value of a firm. The firm’s problem is to choose invest-
ment so as to maximize the present discounted value of profits (Vfs) subject to the law of
1Adding more factors of production would add notational clutter but would not change the derivation.
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motion governing the capital stock (equation A.9). We can write this problem formally as







{Afsg (Kfs, Lfs)− wsLfs − psIfs − c (Ifs, Kfs)
− qfs [Kf,s+1 − (1− ρf )Kfs − Ifs]} (A.11)
where we have replaced pi` in equation (A.10) with the elements given in equation (A.7).
Here, qfs is the Lagrange multiplier, which equals the shadow value of an additional unit
of capital, i.e., qfs = ∂Vfs∂Kfs .
We can use the first-order conditions to understand how firms adjust labor and capital
in response to changes in firm value. The first-order condition with respect to labor (or
any freely-adjustable factor) is
AfsgL (Kfs, Lfs) = ws, (A.12)
which means that each period, firms equate the marginal product of labor with the wage.2
This result does not obtain for capital. The first-order condition with respect to investment
is given by







This equation intuitively tells us that in the absence of adjustment costs (ψ = 0), the
marginal benefit of additional capital (qfs) will equal its marginal cost, ps. When adjust-
ment costs are positive, however, this condition need not hold. Rearranging terms in this
expression gives us equation (7) in the paper.
2This result is the same as that in a specific-factors model
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A.4 Sample Statistics
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics
N Mean Standard 25th Median 75th
Deviation Percentile Percentile
ˆft 137,472 0.01 2.93 -0.88 -0.01 0.84
China Importer Dummy 137,472 0.27 0.44 0.00 0.00 1.00
China Exporter Dummy 137,472 0.04 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00
China Revenue Share 137,472 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.02
Non-China Revenue Share 137,472 0.16 0.23 0.00 0.01 0.29
Large Company Dummy 121,392 0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00 1.00
Industry Protected Dummy 137,472 0.01 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ifs/Kf,s−4 36,016 0.06 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.08
Cashflowfs/Kf,s−4 36,075 0.69 6.25 0.07 0.21 0.53
MTBf,s−4 36,365 1.82 1.67 1.05 1.37 2.04
Ifs 40,270 119.68 499.85 1.59 9.93 48.81
Note: Factor model using stock returns RET from CRSP, ft is estimated from equation 1. Section 5.1 (daily) summary stats are in
the first part of the table and section 5.2 (quarterly) in the lower part for the period 2016Q1 to 2019Q4. China Importer Dummy
and China Exporter Dummy equal one for firms that import or export to China as recorded in Datamyne. China Revenue Share
and Non-China Revenue Share are the shares of a firm’s revenues that come from China and foreign countries other than China,
respectively. The Large Company Dummy is one when a firm has at least 1,000 employees, sourced from FactSet. Industry Protected
Dummy is defined when a firm’s 6-digit NAICS code is affected by US tariff events.The respective variables in CCM are as follows:
Ifs is quarterly capital expenditures (CAPXQ) in millions of dollars, Kfs capital stocks are measured by PPENTQ (Property Plant
and Equipment), Cashflowfs is OIBDPQ (Operating Income Before Depreciation). MTBfs defined as (ATQ+PRCCQ*CSHOQ-SEQQ-
TXDITCQ)/(ATQ), where ATQ is total assets, PRCCQ is the closing stock price in the quarter, CSHOQ is common shares outstanding,
SEQQ is total shareholder’s equity, and TXDITCQ is deferred taxes and investment tax credit. We used TXDBQ (deferred taxes) if
TXDITCQ was missing.
A.5 Additional Results
In this section, we replicate all of our main results using alternative event windows, num-
bers of factors, and specifications.
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A.5.1 Event Study Results with 3-Day Windows
Table A.2: Impact of US Tariff Announcements (3-Day Windows)
Dep. Var.: ˆft Average 01Mar18 22Mar18 17Sep18 10May19
Steel and China Target $200 Billion 10-25% Tariff
Aluminum Announcement Announcement Increase
Announcement Announcement
China Importer -0.076** -0.275*** -0.114** 0.218*** -0.135*
(0.034) (0.073) (0.058) (0.058) (0.079)
China Exporter -0.080 -0.325*** -0.148* 0.224 -0.071
(0.056) (0.113) (0.088) (0.139) (0.103)
China Revenue Share -1.097*** -0.477 -1.223*** 0.059 -2.746***
(0.207) (0.444) (0.319) (0.321) (0.535)
Decomposition of Market Return in Percent
Market Return -8.63 -1.58 -4.66 -0.03 -2.37
Differential Effect -1.31 -0.66 -0.43 0.46 -0.68
Common Effect -5.58 0.04 -2.81 -0.55 -2.26
Total Event Effect -6.89 -0.62 -3.24 -0.09 -2.94
Note: This table presents the results from estimating equation (2). The dependent variable (ˆft) is the abnormal return obtained from
estimating the factor model (equation 1). China Importer is a dummy that equals one if the firm or any of its subsidiaries or suppliers
imports from China. China Exporter is a dummy that equals one if the firm or its subsidiaries export to China. China Revenue Share
is the share of the firm’s revenue that comes from sales in China. The average is the the average of the coefficients on each of the
event days. Standard errors are in parentheses. In the lower panel of the table, we report the cumulative market decline as well as the
differential and common effects as defined in equation (6). In this lower panel, the first column is the total (not the average) for all the
events.
Table A.3: Impact of Chinese Tariff Announcements (3-Day Windows)
Dep. Var.: ˆft Average 02Apr18 15Jun18 23Aug19
China $128 Bln China $50 Bln China Soy/Auto
Announcement Announcement Announcement
China Importer 0.008 0.066 -0.024 -0.018
(0.038) (0.064) (0.065) (0.067)
China Exporter -0.074 0.183** -0.205** -0.200**
(0.050) (0.083) (0.088) (0.091)
China Revenue Share -0.868*** 0.112 -1.489*** -1.228***
(0.246) (0.539) (0.361) (0.355)
Decomposition of Market Return in Percent
Market Return -1.11 0.37 0.11 -1.59
Differential Effect -0.44 0.20 -0.35 -0.29
Common Effect -0.99 -0.21 0.70 -1.47
Total Event Effect -1.43 -0.02 0.35 -1.76
Note: This table presents the results from estimating equation (2). The dependent variable (ˆft) is the abnormal return obtained from
estimating the factor model (equation 1). China Importer is a dummy that equals one if the firm or any of its subsidiaries or suppliers
imports from China. China Exporter is a dummy that equals one if the firm or its subsidiaries export to China. China Revenue Share
is the share of the firm’s revenue that comes from sales in China. The average is the the average of the coefficients on each of the
event days. Standard errors are in parentheses. In the lower panel of the table, we report the cumulative market decline as well as the
differential and common effects as defined in equation (6). In this lower panel, the first column is the total (not the average) for all the
events.
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Table A.4: Impact of U.S.-China Trade-War Announcements (3-Day Windows)
Average of Coefficients
(1) (2) (3) (4)
China Importer -0.112*** -0.020 -0.005 0.031
(0.033) (0.038) (0.033) (0.028)
China Exporter -0.086 -0.079 -0.004 -0.009
(0.056) (0.050) (0.058) (0.040)
China Revenue Share -0.021 0.797***
(0.272) (0.177)
N 60,144 60,144 34,368 42,960
w 1 1 1 1
Events U.S. China Other 5 Largest
Declines 2017
Decomposition of Market Return in Percent
Market Return -8.63 -1.11 -1.71 -3.24
Differential Effect -0.88 -0.19 -0.06 0.81
Common Effect -5.77 -1.10 -2.90 -4.59
Total Event Effect -6.65 -1.28 -2.95 -3.78
Note: This table presents the results from estimating equation (2). The dependent variable (ˆft) is the abnormal return obtained from
estimating the factor model (equation 1). China Importer is a dummy that equals one if the firm or any of its subsidiaries or suppliers
imports from China. China Exporter is a dummy that equals one if the firm or its subsidiaries export to China. China Revenue Share
is the share of the firm’s revenue that comes from sales in China. Standard errors are in parentheses. In the lower panel of the table,
we report the cumulative market decline as well as the differential and common effects as defined in equation (6). In this lower panel,
the first column is the total (not the average) for all the events.
7
Table A.5: Impact of Chinese Tariff Announcements (3-Day Windows)
Average of Coefficients
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
China Importer -0.060* -0.049 -0.024 -0.068* -0.004 -0.024 -0.009
(0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.039) (0.033) (0.037)
China Exporter -0.072 -0.055 -0.093* -0.074 -0.083 -0.074 -0.082
(0.057) (0.057) (0.050) (0.057) (0.050) (0.055) (0.050)
China Revenue Share -0.967*** -1.134*** -0.956*** -1.009*** -1.000*** -1.008*** -0.896***
(0.214) (0.211) (0.251) (0.219) (0.276) (0.206) (0.245)
Industry Protected 0.100
(0.125)
Large Company -0.103* -0.138*
(0.054) (0.072)
Non-China
Revenue Share -0.068 0.101
(0.080) (0.094)
N 60,144 53,109 53,109 60,144 60,144 60,144 60,144
Events U.S. U.S. China U.S. China U.S. China
Number of Factors 2 2 2 2 2 5 5
Decomposition of Market Return in Percent
Market Return -8.38 -6.58 -1.70 -8.63 -1.11 -8.63 -1.11
Differential Effect -1.11 -1.12 -0.67 -1.43 -0.31 -0.90 -0.55
Common Effect -5.46 -4.15 -1.16 -5.50 -1.08 -6.10 -0.84
Total Event Effect -6.56 -5.27 -1.83 -6.93 -1.39 -7.00 -1.39
Note: This table presents the results from estimating equation (2). The dependent variable (ˆft) is the abnormal return obtained from
estimating the factor model (equation 1). China Importer is a dummy that equals one if the firm or any of its subsidiaries or suppliers
imports from China. China Exporter is a dummy that equals one if the firm or its subsidiaries export to China. China Revenue Share
is the share of the firm’s revenue that comes from sales in China. Large Company is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm has 1000 or
more employees. Non-China Revenue Share is the share of the firm’s revenues that comes from foreign companies other than China.
Standard errors are in parentheses. In the lower panel of the table, we report the cumulative market decline as well as the differential
and common effects as defined in equation (6). In this lower panel, the first column is the total (not the average) for all the events.
A.5.2 Additional IK Regressions
In Table A.6, we consider a number of robustness exercises to see how sensitive our in-
vestment results are to alternative specifications. In the first two columns, we switch the
length of the event window to three days, re-estimate the event study and instruments,
and then redo the investment regression. We obtain an almost identical estimate of ψ̂−1
(0.009). Our estimate of the sensitivity of MTB values to the common effect (λˆC) does
not move much, but the sensitivity to the differential effect (λˆD) rises from 3.2 to 5.0. As
we see in Table A.7, we obtain slightly larger estimates of the overall effect of the trade
war than those reported in the paper. In columns 3 and 4, we report estimates of ψ−1
obtained using abnormal returns based on a five-factor model using different window
lengths. These results are also similar to those earlier reported.
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IV IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆4MTBf,s−4 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
∆4 (Cashflowfs/Kf,s−4) 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N 14,390 14,390 14,390 14,390
Time FE yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes
Factor 2 2 5 5
w 1 1 5 1
Overid J-testχ2 2.22 12.20 2.06
[p value] [ 0.53] [ 0.01] [ 0.56]
Weak IV F-test 1,636.5 6,504.7 1,634.3 1,636.3
First Stage ∆4MTBf,s−4 ∆4MTBf,s−4 ∆4MTBf,s−4 ∆4MTBf,s−4
r˜Cf,s−4 0.954∗ 0.589 0.526
(0.545) (0.447) (0.352)
r˜Df,s−4 5.011∗∗∗ 3.276∗∗∗ 6.361∗∗∗
(0.778) (0.493) (1.073)
ν˜f,s−4 1.064∗∗∗ 1.018∗∗∗ 1.101∗∗∗
(0.089) (0.063) (0.091)




First stage F-test 1,637 6,505 1,634 1,636
[p value] [ 0.00] [ 0.00] [ 0.00] [ 0.00]
Notes: If,s/Kf,s−4 is the firm’s quarterly capital expenditures (investment) relative to its 4-quarter lagged capital stock;
∆4(If,s/Kf,s−4) is the 4-quarter change in this variable, MTBfs is the firm’s market-to-book value, and Cashflowf,s/Kf,s−4 is
the firms cash flow divided by its lagged capital stock. As defined in equation (16), r˜Gf,s−4 and r˜
D
f,s−4 are the lagged 4-quarter move-
ment in returns due to the common and differential effects; ν˜f,s−4 is the lagged 4-quarter movement in returns due to idiosyncratic
shocks; and r˙f,s−4 is the lagged 4-quarter movement in returns outside of the event window; and r˜f,s−4 is is the lagged 4-quarter
movement in returns. The coefficient on cashflow in first stage is not reported.
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A.5.3 Data Underlying Figure 4
Table A.7: Effect on Investment Growth Over Time
Date Effects using 7-Day Event Window Effects using 3-Day Event Window
Differential Common Total Event Differential Common Total Event
2019q1 -0.19 -0.07 -0.26 -0.76 -0.23 -0.99
2019q2 -0.31 -0.07 -0.39 -0.84 -0.29 -1.14
2019q3 -0.28 -0.07 -0.35 -0.48 -0.36 -0.84
2019q4 -0.22 -0.05 -0.27 -0.37 -0.29 -0.66
2020q1 -0.11 -0.04 -0.15 0.33 -0.16 0.18
2020q2 -0.17 -0.95 -1.12 -0.00 -0.46 -0.46
2020q3 -0.10 -1.52 -1.62 -0.67 -0.69 -1.36
2020q4 -0.10 -1.47 -1.57 -0.63 -0.67 -1.30
Note: These are the values underlying Figure 4.
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